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Toward Fundamental Change for the
Protection of Low-Wage Workers: The
"Workers' Rights are Human Rights" Debate
in the Obama Era
Ruben J. Garciat
As President Obama's administration begins this year, labor
and employment policy is one of the areas that will likely change.
This change will take the form of a legislative agenda that either
offers new worker protections or reverses past decisions that
have a negative effect on workers' rights. One of the first exam-
ples of change is the enactment of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act, reversing a 2007 Supreme Court decision shutting the door
on pay discrimination claims that were not timely because the
employees did not know they had been discriminated against.1
The legislation codified the "paycheck rule" that the Supreme
Court had endorsed in earlier cases, where the time for filing a
charge of discrimination was restarted with each new paycheck.2
t Associate Professor, California Western School of Law, San Diego. Thanks to the
editors of The University of Chicago Legal Forum for putting on the Symposium "Civil
Rights and the Low-Wage Worker" and to all of the Symposium participants. Thanks also
to Peggie Smith for her comments on the piece at the "Critical Race Theory at 20" Work-
shop at the University of Iowa College of Law. Sara Hoppenrath provided excellent re-
search assistance in the editing process. This Article will be adapted in my forthcoming
book, Marginal Workers: How Legal Fault Lines Divide Workers and Leave Them Without
Protection (NYU 2010). Please do not cite, quote or distribute without the author's ex-
press permission.
I Ledbetter v Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co, 127 S Ct 2162 (2007) (holding that em-
ployees cannot challenge ongoing compensation discrimination if the employer's original
discriminatory decision occurred more than 180 days before, even when the employee
continues to receive paychecks that have been discriminatorily reduced), revd by statute
as stated in Siri v Princeton Club of NY, 59 AD 3d 309, 309 n 1 (A D NY 2009) ('The Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act ... provides that 'an unlawful employment practice occurs, with
respect to discrimination in compensation[,] . .. each time wages, benefits, or other com-
pensation is paid' and effectively nullifies Ledbetter.")
2 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub L No 111-2, 123 Stat 5 (2009), amending
29 USCA § 626, 633a, 794a; and 42 USCA § 2000e-5, e-16 (2000 & Supp 2009). "An un-
lawful employment practice occurs with respect to discrimination in compensation of this
title when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when an
individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or
when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or
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There is also a strong push from organized labor to enact the
Employee Free Choice Act, 3 which aims to facilitate the process
of union organizing and increase the labor movement's ranks.
The long-term effectiveness of these measures in enhancing the
protection of workers, and particularly for the protection of low-
wage workers, remains to be seen.
Each new presidential administration has high hopes for
placing its stamp on labor policy. Republicans seek a return to
laissez-faire economics, and Democrats seek more New Deal-
style protections for workers. The pendulum swings between dif-
ferent administrations are familiar to labor and business, alike.
In Democratic administrations, unions and plaintiffs seek to re-
verse business-friendly decisions from the courts and adminis-
trative agencies. Alternatively, Republicans seek to prevent fur-
ther regulation of the economy by preventing new legislation and
curtailing plaintiffs' lawsuits through procedural devices such as
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.4 This see-saw effect makes
the expansion of workers' rights dependent on the outcome of
elections. The uncertainty fails to produce fundamental changes
for the enforcement of workers' rights.
The Ledbetter Act is emblematic of this pattern. After forty-
five years of litigation under the Civil Rights Acts, the equal pay
gap is not fully resolved. As President Obama said when he
signed the bill, women still earn seventy-eight cents for the same
work for every dollar that men earn, and "women of color [earn]
even less." 5 Over forty years of litigation under the Civil Rights
Act and Equal Pay Act have yet to fully rectify that gap. In at-
tempts to explain this wage gap, scholars have pointed to other
aspects of structural and systemic discrimination in employment,
such as job choice and levels of educational attainment. 6 There
other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, result-
ing in whole or in part from such a decision or practice." 42 USC § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A).
3 HR 1409, § 4(b), 111th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 10, 2009), available at
<http://govtrack.uslcongress[billtext.xpd?bill=hl 11-1409> (last visited Mar 21, 2009).
4 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 USC §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1771-75.
5 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President Upon Signing the Lilly Ledbetter Bill,
The White House Blog (Jan 29, 2009), available at <http:l/www.whitehouse.gov/
blog-post/AWonderfulDay/> (last visited Apr 7, 2009). See also Darlene Superville, Equal-
Pay Bill Becomes Law, Obama's First, The Press of Atlantic City A3 (Jan 30, 2009)
(summarizing the signing of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009).
6 See, for example, Susan Strum, Second Generation Structural Discrimination, 101
Colum L Rev 458, 461 (2001). Racial and gender inequalities persist mostly through
second generation discrimination that consists of cognitive biases and patterns of interac-
tion. This type of discrimination cannot be combated properly through courts interpreting
and enforcing specific rules fashioned for a more deliberate, first generation type of dis-
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are a variety of economic factors that also come into play, but
even controlling for certain economic factors does not fully ex-
plain the gap. 7 These two examples highlight the need for a hu-
man rights framework to better protect low-wage workers. This
Article explains how a human rights framework can be used
more effectively to advocate for equal pay and the right to organ-
ize. The need for viewing workers' rights as human rights is due
to the limits of the statutory reform process.
Although statutory change will continue to be an important
part of Work Law, the limitations of statutory change raise the
following questions applicable to the civil rights of low-wage
workers. First, what kinds of legal advocacy will best further the
rights of the most marginal workers in our society? Second, what
discourse will best unify disparate strands of Work Law, such as
employment discrimination, labor law, and employment law? In
this Article, I argue that current statutory schemes divide work-
ers into different categories. This is evident from the fact that
there are different statutes to cover different kinds of employees.
For example, there are separate statutes protecting the disabled,
the aged, and non-citizens.8 There are statutes that deal only
with pay, some that deal with unequal pay related to gender, and
some that deal with discrimination in all working conditions. 9
Under the National Labor Relations Act, for example, employees
eligible to be unionized are divided into professional and nonpro-
fessional employees, but they cannot be part of the same bargain-
ing unit without an election. 10
These dichotomies call for a new discourse about workers'
rights unified by the principle that labor rights are human
crimination.
7 Compare Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56
U Chi L Rev 1311, 1334 (1989) (supporting a laissez faire method to combat discrimina-
tion and stipulating that antidiscrimination laws interfere with economically efficient
behavior and, therefore, reduce the overall social welfare of women), with John J. Dono-
hue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U Chi
L Rev 1337, 1347 (1989) (articulating a dynamic efficiency argument that shows that "a
law penalizing discrimination will succeed in driving out the discriminators-thereby
reducing the psychic costs of discrimination-even more quickly than would occur under
laissez faire").
8 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 USC §§ 12101 et seq (2000 & Supp
2008); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 USC §§ 701 et seq (2000 & Supp 2008).
9 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq (2000 & Supp
2008).
10 National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC § 159(b), gives the NLRB the power to certi-
fy bargaining units, except that the Board "shall not decide that the unit is appropriate
for any purposes if such unit includes both professional and nonprofessional employees
unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit."
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rights. Statutory rights by their nature are changeable, mallea-
ble, and politically contingent. Thus, they form an inadequate
foundation for long-lasting change. Over more than twenty years,
critical scholars have discussed the ways in which law has failed
the most vulnerable in our society. The intervention of law to
improve the conditions of people of color, women, and immi-
grants has achieved some successes and some failures.
While there have been notable legislative and judicial victo-
ries in areas such as racial profiling, sexual harassment, and
hate crimes, there are other areas where progress is needed. Al-
though the NLRA has been in effect since 1935 and explicitly
encourages collective bargaining, the percentage of workers
represented by labor unions has dropped from a high mark of 35
percent in the 1950s, to approximately 8 percent in the private
sector. At the same time, the earning power of workers has de-
creased. 1 With the start of the Obama administration, hopes
were high that the Employee Free Choice Act-a bill that would,
among other things, make it easier to form unions-would be
passed and signed as soon as Democrats obtained a 60-vote ma-
jority in the Senate. Enacting the EFCA turned out to be not as
easy as expected. 12
Labor advocates in the last several decades have shown
greater interest in advocacy in constitutional and international
areas of workers' rights. This advocacy has included addressing
the needs of undocumented immigrants working in conditions
approaching involuntary servitude, and the incorporation of in-
ternational human rights principles into federal court actions
dealing with corporate labor abuses abroad. Human trafficking
laws have been enacted under congressional authority in Section
II of the Thirteenth Amendment. 13 Recent scholarship has
grounded the right to organize under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's prohibition of "involuntary servitude" on the theory that,
without the right to associate and bargain, workers are not in the
free labor condition that the Amendment intended for workers in
11 Union Membership Posts Significant Gain in 2008, BLS Reports, Daily Labor Re-
port AA-1 (BNA Jan 29, 2009) (comparing the sum of private sector and public sector
union membership, currently 12.4 percent, to private sector union membership only,
currently 7.6 percent).
12 Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill to Assist Unions, NY Times
Al (July 17, 2009) (discussing the political forces arrayed against card check).
13 See, for example, Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub L No 106-386,
114 Stat 1464 (2000 & Supp 2008), codified at 22 USC §§ 7101-7200.
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the public and private sectors. 14 In addition, various courts have
found international law protections for the right to organize and
bargain collectively to be part of the "law of nations" under the
Alien Tort Claims Act. 15 These innovations are important moves
toward recognition of labor rights as ones that cannot be depen-
dent on who is in political power at a particular time.
In this Article, I suggest a default interpretive rule could be
used by courts to construe protective labor statutes in favor of
workers. This can be done by reference to the many international
principles that the United States is committed to with regard to
workers' rights-including the freedom of association and the
right to be free from discrimination, rights that are underlying
the current debates about the amendment of the NLRA and the
Equal Pay Act. While much of the effect of the fundamental
rights analysis will be seen in how the courts apply these prin-
ciples to statutory matters, workers' rights advocates can also
use international principles to further workers' rights under do-
mestic laws. Indeed, there are many instances currently of this
approach being taken by labor unions and nongovernmental or-
ganizations.
A new dialogue about workers' rights requires critical ex-
amination of rights talk in Work Law. 16 Much of the debate sur-
rounding the protection of the civil rights of minorities that oc-
14 See Maria Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers' Rights in a Post-Hoffman World-
Organizing Around The Thirteenth Amendment, 18 Geo Imm L J 651, 662-74 (2004)
(proposing that the Thirteenth Amendment should apply to undocumented workers);
James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and
the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 Colum L Rev 1, 3-13 (2002)
(arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment, rather than the Commerce Clause, should be
used to enforce labor and human rights); Lea VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, 138 U Pa L Rev 437, 438-39 (1989) (suggesting that the Thirteenth
Amendment includes issues of labor beyond the abolition of slavery). See also US Const
Amend XIII, § 2 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist in the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
15 See 28 USC § 1350 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction over
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States."); Estate of Rodriguez v Drummond Co, 256 F Supp 2d
1250, 1259-60 (N D Ala 2003) ("As previously noted, three conditions must be met for
subject matter jurisdiction under the [Alien Tort Claims Act]: (1) the plaintiff must be an
alien; (2) the cause of action must be for a tort; and (3) the tort must be committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
16 Work Law is the general term used to describe the constituent subjects of Labor
Law, Employment Law, Employment Discrimination and Employee Benefits. The field
includes the public and private sector workers, and incorporates tort doctrines, constitu-
tional law, and contract analysis. Basically, the field of Work Law addresses the legal
ramifications that arise anytime work is done.
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curred in Critical Race Theory and Critical Legal Studies 17 has
yet to occur in the context of Work Law. In Work Law, the cur-
rent focus is on incremental improvement of statutory rights.
There is little attention to the kinds of rights that would best
protect workers. Quite apart from the need for improvements in
statutory schemes is the need to conceive of workers' rights on a
more basic level. This, I believe, is necessary for more fundamen-
tal change in the way that workers' rights are viewed and en-
forced in contemporary society. One way to accomplish this is
through greater advocacy of certain minimum rights as recog-
nized in international and constitutional law.
Numerous scholars have made cogent and worthy efforts to
improve the statutory protection of workers.18 Indeed, this is
much of the focus in the field of Work Law. In many of those sit-
uations, statutes have played a positive role in social change. On
the other hand, many statutory rights are still contested and de-
bated. For example, the minimum wage is still a contested con-
cept with many people questioning whether the minimum wage
is ultimately a negative for low-wage workers. 19 Other rights,
such as the right to be free from discrimination, the right to be
free from slavery, and the right to be free from child labor have
become part of international law, and have also been established
in American law.20
In order to avoid the pendulum swings of politics, advocates
must argue for more fundamental norms for the protection of
labor rights. Statutory protections, while important, will not pro-
vide long-lasting change toward establishing workers' rights as
17 See, generally, Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 Harv CR-
CL L Rev 297, 297-434 (1987) ; Responses to Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Stu-
dies Movement, 23 Harv CR-CL L Rev 293, 293-414 (1988).
18 Ellen Dannin, Taking Back the Workers Law (Cornell 2005); Paul Secunda, Reflec-
tions on the Technicolor Right of Association, 96 Kentucky L J 343 (2008); Rebecca E.
Zietlow and James Gray Pope, The Toledo Auto-Lite Strike of 1934 and the Fight Against
'Wage Slavery,"38 U Toledo L Rev 839, 839-54 (2007); Lea VanderVelde, The Thirteenth
Amendment of Our Aspirations, 38 U Toledo L Rev 855, 855-81 (2007); Risa L. Goluboff,
Race, Labor, and the Thirteenth Amendment in the 1940s Department of Justice, 38 U
Toledo L Rev 883, 883-94 (2007). See also Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil
Rights (Harvard 2007).
19 David Card and Alan B. Krueger, Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of
the Minimum Wage (Princeton 1997); George Borjas, David B. Freeman and Lawrence F.
Katz, On the Labor Market Effects of Immigration and Trade, in George Borjas and David
B. Freeman, Immigration and the Workforce (National Bureau of Economic Research
1992).
20 International Labour Organization, Declaration of Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, available at <www.ilo.org/declaration>. See also US Const. Amend XIII
(prohibition of involuntary servitude), Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (child labor pro-
vision); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000e et seq.
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fundamental under constitutional and international law prin-
ciples. Workers' rights must be seen as fundamental to the func-
tioning of a democratic society, rather than as the special inter-
est agenda of unions or plaintiffs' attorneys. This can be done
through more advocacy for a minimum set of workers' rights as
human rights, including the right to organize labor unions and
the right to be free from discrimination, which undergird both
the Employee Free Choice Act and the Ledbetter Act.
This Article places the movement toward international labor
rights in the context of the debates among critical scholars about
the importance of rights generally in liberal legalism. As in the
prior debates, the need for minimum rights to protect outsiders
• such as low-wage workers is a starting point. In this Article, I
establish that a minimum level of workers' rights is necessary
and not problematic. The remaining question concerns the types
of rights that will best protect marginal and low-wage workers
and lead to a jurisprudence of fundamental worker rights. This is
already being done in labor movement circles which rally under
the banner that "labor rights are human rights."21 Building upon
the expansion of labor rights into international areas, I will de-
scribe the potential for these norms to be incorporated in the ad-
vocacy strategies of low-wage workers. I will rejoin the debate
between whether social movements should rely on the courts or
legislatures to protect their interests and apply these insights to
the protection of worker rights.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by discussing
the debate about the place of human rights dialogue for vulnera-
ble workers. Part II discusses the state of the Equal Pay Act af-
ter the Lilly Ledbetter case and how the Equal Pay Act is em-
blematic of the way that statutory protections can divide work-
ers. Part III looks at the possibilities of the Employee Free
Choice Act, a statute that organized labor has made a priority in
the Obama Administration, which is at its essence a restatement
of what the law has required since 1935. Part III will also ad-
dress how the EFCA does not, and cannot, address one of the
largest segments of the low-wage worker population-immigrant
workers. In order to further the needs of immigrant workers
21 James A. Gross, ed, A Long Overdue Beginning: The Promotion and Protection of
Workers' Rights as Human Rights in Workers' Rights as Human Rights (ILR 2003); Gay
Seidman, Beyond the Boycott: Labor Rights, Human Rights and Transnational Activism
(Russell Sage 2007); Zaragoza Vargas, Labor Rights are Civil Rights: Mexican American
Workers in Twentieth Century America (Princeton 2005); Jennifer Gordon, Suburban
Sweatshops: The Fight For Immigrant Rights (Harvard 2005).
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seeking to organize regardless of their immigration status, a con-
ception of freedom of association and collective bargaining as
fundamental human rights must be the foundation of any at-
tempt to change attitudes about the protection of workers' rights
in our society today. Part IV discusses ways to make workers'
rights fundamental in our society, and not politically contingent
or perks for "special interests" when worker-friendly politicians
are in power. 22 In the end, the Article draws upon scholarship on
legal consciousness to transfer a discourse of fundamental rights
to Work Law. The content and parameters of those rights is im-
portant for elevating these rights to a place where more people,
especially judges, legislators, and policymakers, see them as fun-
damental.
I. THE TENSION BETWEEN LIBERAL REFORM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS STRATEGIES
Even when a statute is passed to improve the protection of
workers, there is still resistance by the business community and
a general ignorance about the foundations of why workers are
protected. Instead of steady progress, Work Law follows a pat-
tern that Kimberl6 Crenshaw first identified in her foundational
article Race, Reform and Retrenchment.23 Crenshaw described a
dialectical cycle of liberal incremental reform followed by back-
lash and retrenchment. The question then is whether a new dis-
course of workers' rights can be a better organizing principle for
workers' rights, both for the labor movement and for advocates in
courts.
While a shift has already occurred in the form of new advo-
cacy movements and legal theories, there remains a debate about
the place of human rights discourse in the protection of workers'
rights. A recent volume of New Labor Forum included a colloquy
between Jay Youngdahl and Lance Compa on the question of
whether the language of human rights is the best vehicle for
promoting the protection of workers. 24 Youngdahl argued that
22 For analysis of how unions and plaintiffs' lawyers are treated as special interests,
see, for example, Walter Olson, The Excuse Factory: How Employment Law Is Paralyzing
the American Workplace 163 (Free Press 1997).
23 Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv L Rev 1331 (1988).
24 Jay Youngdahl, Solidarity First: Labor Rights are Not the Same as Human Rights,
18 New Labor Forum 31 (Winter 2009); Lance Compa, Solidarity and Human Rights, A
Response to Youngdahl, 18 New Labor Forum 38 (Winter 2009). See also James A. Gross,
ed, Workers'Rights as Human Rights 107 (Cornell 2006).
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international human rights tend to be too individualistic and not
focused on the solidarity that the labor movement needs to build
collective power. Compa saw human rights as one important
strategy among many and an important way of building coali-
tions with emergent movements. Youngdahl countered that the
human rights frame is not the problem-the problem remains
the need for workers to build enough power to resist capital's
inevitable resistance to their demands. 25
Although Youngdahl made good points about the need for so-
lidarity and caution about the individualistic tendency in human
rights, I agree with Compa that human rights discourse is
needed to better protect workers in today's society. I believe that
the discourse of human rights provides a frame that the broad
public, and some judges and other decision-makers will more
readily enforce worker rights if they are put in the language of
human rights. Further, as amendment to legislation continues to
be stymied, there will continue to be a need for alternative strat-
egies to further workers' rights.
Certain key articles in the late 1980s and the early 1990s
remain among the most cited and central works in Work Law.26
For decades, critical theorists have seen Work Law as an in-
tensely politicized arena which illustrated the "politics of law"
very well.2 7 Judges either tended to favor their class interests
over worker solidarity or ignored issues of racial or gender power
in the workplace. To a large extent, their critiques were perfectly
true and accurate. The problem is that this approach to the pro-
25 Lance Compa, Solidarity and Human Rights: A Response to Youngdahl (cited in
note 24); Jay Youngdahl, Youngdahl Replies, 18 New Labor Forum 46, 46-47 (2009) ("The
human rights framing just puts off the fundamental issue in the workplace-how are the
efforts of labor to be divided? This has been the nexus of the fight between labor and
capital since the dawn of capitalism. It is why labor can never be a human rights move-
ment like others. The hostile management response to the Employee Free Choice Act
(EFCA) is not because it is a human rights issue; it is because increased unionization has
the potential to strengthen the ability of workers to get more of the pie.").
26 Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersec-
tion of Title VII and the NLRA. Not!, 28 Harv CR-CL L Rev 395, 399-403 (1993) (propos-
ing that the intersection between the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and Title
VII works to limit the chance for women of minorities to obtain redress for workplace
harms and to prevent change in the workplace); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Pers-
pectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 Duke L J 365, 383-85 (1991) (ex-
plaining how minority racial characteristics are treated in antidiscrimination law); Kim-
berl6 W. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U
Chi Legal F 139, 140-50 (coining and explaining the term "intersectionality").
27 See, for example, Karl E. Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in David
Kairys, ed, The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 539 (Basic Books 1998); James B.
Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law (Massachusetts 1983).
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tection of workers' rights does not further the fundamental pro-
tection of marginalized workers. In this Article, I argue for an
attitudinal change in which judges, legislators, and scholars see
the fundamental value of workers' rights.
In a foundational article of Critical Legal Studies, Mark
Tushnet wrote that rights talk "does not do much good .... [i]n
the contemporary United States." He continued, "[rights talk] is
positively harmful."28 The challenge for legal scholarship that
seeks to protect workers' rights has been to avoid the reification
of rights as ends in themselves, as well as to sidestep the back-
lash against rights that has led in Work Law to judicial accep-
tance of the rights of dissenters in unions, or the right of employ-
ers to speak to their employees about unionization-both of
which have weakened the labor movement in various ways. 29 The
question for this Article then is not whether rights are needed,
but what kind of rights are most effective in making a place for
workers' rights among those considered fundamental to the func-
tioning of democratic societies.
Streams of outsider jurisprudence have struggled with the
limitations of rights ever since critical legal studies emerged in
the 1970s and 1980s. 30 Outsider jurisprudence is the name given
to a number of different genres of scholarship, which focus on the
most marginalized members of society, including Critical Legal
Studies, Critical Race Theory, LatCrit Theory, Queer Theory,
and Feminist Theory, among others.31 Labor and employment
scholars must also come to grips with the role of rights talk in
the protection of vulnerable workers. As an example, Jennifer
Gordon experienced the implementation of rights strategies on
behalf of immigrant workers in her work as director of the
28 Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex L Rev 1363, 1386 (1984).
29 Pattern Makers League of North America, AFL-CIO v NLRB, 473 US 95 (1985)
(union members can resign at any time); Communications Workers of America v Beck, 487
US 735 (1988) (union members can change their status to "agency fee payers" and be
responsible only for the costs of grievance administration and collective bargaining.)
30 See, for example, John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical
Social Science 1 (North Carolina 1995) ("[l]t was not until the 1920s that more than an
isolated soul would claim that legal science was unscientific."); Roberto Mangabeira Un-
ger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement 50-51 (Harvard 1986) (suggesting that the
distinction between questionable and acceptable legal classifications under the equal
protection doctrine may "reinforce entrenched positions in the social division of labor and
systematic, discontinuous differentials of access to wealth, power and culture").
31 See Francisco Valdes, Culture, "Kulturkampf," and Beyond: The Antidiscrimina-
tion Principle Under the Jurisprudence of Backlash, in Austin Sarat, ed, The Blackwell
Companion to Law and Society 271 (Wiley Blackwell 2004); Francisco Valdes, Outsider
Scholars, Legal Theory and OutCrit Perspectivity, 49 De Paul L Rev 831 (2000).
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Workplace Project in Long Island. In her book Suburban Sweat-
shops: The Fight for Immigrant Rights, Gordon described an ap-
proach that sought to use rights talk strategically, while building
workers' capacity to organize collectively to accomplish their
goals. 32
Critical theorists long have noted the problems and oppor-
tunities created by intersecting legal identities affecting people of
color.33 Women of color, in particular, have been caught in the
margins of race and sex by antidiscrimination laws that seem to
provide two different bases of protection, while actually provid-
ing less protection than for white women or black men. This
scholarship has been important in showing the multiple identi-
ties of individuals. This Article also focuses on workers with in-
tersecting identities-such as African American workers in un-
ions, immigrants of color, and white women. The point of this
Article is to introduce competing bodies of law as a further mar-
ginalizing factor for low-income workers. In the presence of com-
peting bodies of law that attempt to address the multiple identi-
ties of individuals, paradoxically, less protection is accorded to
low-wage workers.
There are several prescriptions to ameliorate the status of
low-wage workers. A holistic approach to law making, for exam-
ple, might lead legislators to take into consideration the gaps
into which workers might fall. This approach, however, is diffi-
cult for legislators to implement because the compromises in-
volved in the legislative process inevitably leave gaps through
which some workers will fall. The recent eviscerations of the
Equal Pay Act, discussed in this Article, and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, in the recent revision to the overtime regulations,
reveal the inadequacy of statutes in bringing lasting change to
the material status of low-wage workers.34 As a result, there is a
need to fill in the gaps in rights protections, but as illustrated in
32 Jennifer Gordon, Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigration Rights 148-84
(Belknap 2005).
33 I use critical theory in this Article to include a number of genres of "outsider juri-
sprudence," such as Critical Race Theory. For foundational writings on outsider jurispru-
dence, consider Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduc-
tion (NYU 2001); Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, eds, The Latino/a Condition: A
Critical Reader (NYU 1998); Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, et al, eds, Critical Race Theory: The
Key Writings that Formed the Movement (New Press 1995); Angela P. Harris, Foreword:
The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 Cal L Rev 741, 744 n 15 (1994) (pointing out that
Mari Matsuda coined the term "outsider jurisprudence").
34 Jared Bernstein and Ross Eisenbrey, Eliminating the Right to Overtime Pay, Re-
port of the Economic Policy Institute (June 26, 2003).
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numerous examples, statutes have not been able to fully protect
workers. These include cases involving the labor rights of undo-
cumented workers, noncitizens, workers of color in unions, and
public employees. 35 In construing laws, courts could interpret
laws in a more holistic way, so that the purposes of various sta-
tutes could be reconciled. 36 There are some established divisions
between workers, based on, for example, supervisory status, pro-
fessional status, or agricultural work. The justifications for these
distinctions have been discussed elsewhere. 37 The workers I am
discussing in this Article all fit into the statutory definition of"employee," which means that they are subject to the control of
an employer. 38
The core paradox of statutory protections is that the prolife-
ration of protective labor laws has failed to adequately protect
the workers at which they are aimed. Although workers are bet-
ter protected now than they were in the 1800s, worker protec-
tions are not as strong as they could be given the complex web of
statutes that govern their working conditions. This is for several
reasons. First, labor and employment statutory schemes are of-
ten in conflict. Several Supreme Court decisions tell the story of
marginalized workers such as immigrants, workers of color, and
35 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc v NLRB, 535 US 137 (2002); Espinoza v Farah
Manufacturing Company, 414 US 86 (1973); Emporium Capwell v Western Addition
Community Organization, 420 US 50 (1975); Garcetti v Ceballos, 547 US 410 (2006) (cas-
es discussed in the articles in the note directly below).
36 This Article builds on previous work that I have done, and places it in a theoretical
framework about how law impacts the lives of workers. See Ruben J. Garcia, Labor's
Fragile Freedom of Association, 8 U Pa J Labor and Empl L 283, 285-86 (2006) (suggest-
ing that the events of September 11, 2001, in combination with national concerns of illeg-
al immigration, led to the Supreme Court's anti-immigration decision in Hoffman, 535 US
137; Ruben J. Garcia, Across the Borders: Immigrant Status and Identity in Law and Lat
Crit Theory, 55 Fla L Rev 511, 519 (2003) (arguing that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 should be amended by Congress to prohibit discrimination against immigrants
authorized for employment under the law); Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Inter-
connected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor
Laws, 36 U Mich J L Reform 737, 765 (2003) ("Labor law and immigration law reform are
both needed, but until that happens, courts must reconcile separate bodies of law in a
way that serves the stated policy objectives of both statutory schemes."); Ruben J. Garcia,
New Voices at Work: Race and Gender Identity Caucuses in the U.S. Labor Movement, 54
Hastings L J 79, 112 (2002) (proposing that identity caucuses can assist in democratizing
labor unions for the benefit of women, immigrants, and minorities).
37 William B. Gould, A Primer on American Labor Law 36 (MIT, 4th ed 2004).
38 For a discussion of the factors determining employee status, see, for example,
Donovan v Sureway Cleaners, 656 F2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir 1981) (formatting a six-factor
test for determining whether a worker is an employee). See also Donovan v DialAmerica
Mktg, 757 F2d 1376, 1385 (3d Cir 1985) (adopting the Sureway Cleaners test to hold that
persons working from home researching telephone numbers were employees under the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938).
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women. The legal dynamics of marginalization affect all workers,
however, because of the nature of interlocking statutory
schemes.
Second, judges can marginalize workers by pitting different
statutory schemes at odds with one another. This phenomenon
raises the question of whether statutory protections can some-
times be counterproductive and whether the resources put to-
ward protective labor legislation for workers should be refocused.
Instead of departing from statutory protection altogether, atten-
tion should be paid to the constitutional and international hu-
man rights of workers. In the end, international and constitu-
tional principles can inform the proper interpretation of statuto-
ry rights that do exist.
Third, critical legal theorists must grapple with a way to use
international labor law concepts to bridge the legal margins that
deny vulnerable workers adequate legal remedies without being
caught in the trap of liberal legalism that legislative change
sometimes lays. The place of international principles in Ameri-
can law is under dispute. Some judges have explicitly referred to
foreign principles in their decisions, largely because of the Alien
Tort Claims Act and its explicit incorporation of international
law. Other judges have questioned the place of foreign law in the
courts.39 This Article will argue that international principles are
important because they transcend the blowing winds of politics
and establish worker rights as fundamental.
Debates about the best way to protect the most vulnerable
members of society have vexed legal scholars and practitioners
for decades. Most of these debates, however, revolve around
rights or no rights. This Article questions whether the debate is
so stark. Rather, the question is "what kind of rights?" This Ar-
ticle argues that constitutional and international worker rights
should be the primary focus for advocates of worker rights. In the
hierarchy of American law, constitutional and international
rights have greater purchase than statutory rights.
There are other problems with statutory protections of
workers' rights. First, protective labor legislation has been sus-
pended in times of crisis, most recently in the post-9/11 era, such
as the suspension of prevailing wage statutes in New Orleans.
39 Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws: The Court Should
Never View a Foreign Legal Decision as a Precedent in Any Way, Legal Affairs (July-Aug
2004), available at <http://www.legalaffairs.org/issueslJuly-August-2004/feature-posner
julaug04.msp> (last visited Apr 5, 2009) (arguing that foreign legal decisions should not
have any precedential value).
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Second, statutes are also subject to be construed in ways that are
at odds with their intent or purpose. Finally, statutes can be
changed with the blowing winds of political change-sometimes
for the better, but sometimes for the worse.
Besides leaving workers in many cases without protection,
overlapping protections may actually impede worker solidarity
and divide workers against themselves. I argue that gaps in legal
protection, and in the divisions that they might create, can be
addressed by reference to international human rights norms. As
the law continues to recognize the universality of the concerns of
all workers through international norms, workers themselves
will be more likely to see their commonalities and organize for
change. As shown in two recent legislative campaigns brought by
the allies of labor, statutory changes are often changes at the
edges of the law without changes to underlying structural fea-
tures of inequality, or seeing some rights, such as the right to be
free from discrimination or the right to free association, as min-
imum labor standards.
II. LILLY LEDBETTER'S STORY: CAUGHT IN THE GAPS BETWEEN
TITLE VII AND THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963
Equal pay is a good starting point to discuss whether the
promise of statutory rights has been fulfilled. In his 1994 book
Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mo-
bilization, Michael W. McCann uses the pay equity movement as
a case study for the thesis on the importance of legal rights for
social movements. 40 He concludes that even when the movement
had been unsuccessful in the courts, the activity furthered a dis-
course about pay equity that advanced the cause of the move-
ment. 41 The recent Ledbetter episode highlights some of the les-
sons of McCann's work but also shows the limitations of statuto-
ry discourse. The arrival of the Obama Administration also pro-
vides an opportunity for social movements to decide the best
means for long-term change for vulnerable workers.
The story of Lilly Ledbetter, and the legislation that in-
tended to correct the injustice done in her case, is emblematic of
the way that statutes frequently offer only piecemeal change.
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 was the product of the efforts of fe-
40 Michael McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal
Mobilization (Chicago 1994).
41 Id at 23-47.
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minists and their allies in the wake of greater equality in the
workplace. 42 In brief, the Act requires equal pay for equal work,
but the employer can defend unequal pay if there is an alterna-
tive reason other than sex.43 The issue in Equal Pay Act cases is
whether women are paid differently for performing the same jobs
as men. Plaintiffs in Equal Pay Act cases also can bring claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which covers pay
practices that discriminate on the basis of protected categories
like race, sex, and national origin. Victims of pay discrimination
can sue under either the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, or both. The
different limitations periods under the two statutes generally
determine whether the plaintiff will bring suit under Title VII,
the Equal Pay Act, or both. Under Title VII, the plaintiff has to
bring a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission ("EEOC") with six months of the "discrete acts" of dis-
crimination about which the plaintiff complains. Discrete acts of
discrimination include "termination, failure to promote, denial of
transfer and refusal to hire."44 Under the Equal Pay Act, which
incorporates the enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, a violation must be brought within two years of the
violation, or three years for willful violations. 45
The multiple options that are available to equal pay plain-
tiffs do not guarantee success. This is evident in Lilly Ledbetter's
case. Ledbetter worked at Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
in Gadsen, Alabama from 1979 to 1998.46 She worked her way up
to be a supervisor, but before retiring in 1998, she anonymously
received a payroll sheet in her mailbox showing that her salary
was significantly lower than that of her male counterparts who
performed the same work. Ledbetter sued under Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act. Her case under Title VII went to a jury,
which found pay discrimination. Although the record is unclear
as to why, her Equal Pay Act claim was dismissed by the district
42 See Id.
43 See 29 USC § 206(d) (1) (2000) ("No employer ... shall discriminate ... between
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than the
rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex ... for equal work."). See
also Robert L. Nelson and William P. Bridges, Legalizing Gender Inequality: Courts,
Markets and Unequal Pay for Women in America 2 (Cambridge 1999) ("[A] substantial
portion of the pay differences between male and female jobs, especially in large organiza-
tions, cannot be attributed to the market and does not rest on efficiency principles.").
44 National Passenger Corp. v Morgan, 536 US 101, 114 (2002).
45 29 USC § 255(c) (2008).
46 Ledbetter v Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co, 127 S Ct 2162, 2166 (2007).
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court.47 Even if the "paycheck rule," or the principle that the sta-
tute of limitations can be restarted with every discriminatory
paycheck, might be used to allow a suit under Title VII, it does
not affect the statute of limitations under the Equal Pay Act,
which accrues either two or three years after the unequal pay
decision.
On appeal, Ledbetter's jury verdict on the Title VII claim
was set aside by the Eleventh Circuit on the grounds that the
claim should have been time-barred in the district court.48 After
Ledbetter took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, Chief Justice
John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito joined the
Court, replacing Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Associate
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. While the replacement of two Re-
publican justices with two other Republicans may not have made
a difference in most cases, the retirement of Justice O'Connor
negatively affected Ledbetter's chances on appeal. After all, Jus-
tice O'Connor was part of the unanimous Court in 1986 that de-
cided Bazemore v Friday. This case was relied upon heavily by
Ledbetter for its rule that the time for filing an EEOC charge re-
sets with each new discriminatory paycheck. 49 Even the late
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the unanimous opinion in Baze-
more.
In the end, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were part
of the five-member majority ruling against Ledbetter, with Jus-
tice Alito writing the Court's opinion. The Court concluded that
the "discrete acts" required by the 180 day filing rule for Ledbet-
ter's EEOC claim could not be renewed with each discriminatory
paycheck. 50 Justice Alito wrote that the "paycheck rule" would
not "breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination."5 1 Thus,
Ledbetter requires workers who want to know if they are the vic-
tims of pay discrimination to seek information about their pay
47 Id. See also Ledbetter v Goodyear Tire Co, 421 F3d 1169, 1175 n7 (11th Cir 2005).
48 Id at 1185.
49 Bazemore v Friday, 478 US 385, 395-96 (1986) ("Each week's paycheck that deliv-
ers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII,
regardless of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title VII.").
50 See also Nail Railroad Passenger Corp v Morgan, 536 US 101, 116-18 (2002) (hold-
ing that Title VII prohibits recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that
occur outside the statutory time period and that consideration of the entire scope of a
hostile work environment claim, including behavior outsides statutory time period is
appropriate so long as any act contributing to that hostile work environment takes places
within the statutory time period); Del State College v Ricks, 449 US 250, 256-59 (1980)
(holding that the filing limitation periods of Title VII commence at the time of the alleged
discriminatory acts, not when the consequences of the acts culminate).
51 127 S Ct at 2165.
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compared to other workers. As Justice Ginsburg wrote on behalf
of three other Justices in the dissenting opinion, the Court's de-
cision encourages workers who think they have been discrimi-
nated against to try to ascertain their company's salary practices
even though some workplaces prohibit any discussion of salary
practices. 52
Ledbetter is an example of a worker who is caught between
different statutory schemes. In its recitation of the procedural
posture of the case, the Court mentioned that the district court
granted the defendants' summary judgment on Ledbetter's Equal
Pay Act claim.53 The record is not clear about why Ledbetter did
not appeal the dismissal of this claim. Nonetheless, in the dis-
trict court, Ledbetter might have been unable to meet the de-
fense's argument that the pay disparity was based on a factor"other than sex."54 Unlike the Paycheck Fairness Act, however,
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act did not deal with these defenses.
After the Court's ruling on May 29, 2007, Lilly Ledbetter be-
came a symbol of the problem of equal pay and the appearance
that the Supreme Court majority is indifferent to the plight of
working women. Several commentators decried the Court majori-
ty's turning a blind eye to the precedent in Bazemore. Many of
the commentators pointed to the difficulty that many workers
have in ascertaining what their wages are and how this difficulty
diminishes a worker's ability to bring a timely lawsuit.55 The
Court's interpretation of the statute, which is indifferent not only
to the economic realities of working women, but also to the diffi-
culty faced by all workers put the onus back on Congress to fill
the gaps through which workers like Ledbetter will fall.
Democrats in Congress responded swiftly to seize upon the
political momentum that Ledbetter's case provided. 56 Represent-
ative George Miller, a Democrat from California, introduced the
Ledbetter Bill within a month of the Supreme Court's decision in
2007. Hearings followed that addressed the pay gap and the ina-
52 Id at 2181-84 (Ginsburg dissenting).
53 Id at 2169 (majority).
54 29 USC § 206(d)(1) (2000).
55 See, for example, Rafael Gely, Pay Secrecy/Confidentiality Rules and the National
Labor Relations Act, 6 U Pa J Lab & Emp L 121 (2003).
56 Robert Pear, Justices' Ruling in Discrimination Case May Draw Quick Action from
Obama, NY Times A13 (Jan 4, 2009) (reporting that Obama and Democrats in Congress
would take quick action to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter); Lori
Montgomery, White House Threatens to Veto Discrimination Bill, Wash Post A04 (Apr 23,
2008) (discussing how Republicans in the White House threatened to veto the Lilly Led-
better Fair Pay Bill).
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bility of workers to know whether they had been discriminated
against in pay. Comparable worth and the fact that thirty-seven
years of litigation under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII had not
fully closed the wage gap were not brought to the foreground as
issues. The Bill made it through the newly Democratic-controlled
House on a party line vote in July 2007 before stalling in the Se-
nate throughout 2007 and 2008. The Senators holding the Bill
expressed concern that it would lead to frivolous lawsuits, a
common, yet ironic, response to a bill that deals entirely with
procedure. 57
The 2008 presidential campaign gave renewed life to Ledbet-
ter's attempts to change the law. Ledbetter herself began joining
Barack and Michelle Obama at various campaign stops. Ledbet-
ter told her story as a way of emphasizing the next president's
role in appointing more Supreme Court justices and the threat of
further institutionalizing the conservative bent to the Court. In
the late stages of the campaign, Ledbetter also did a voiceover for
Obama's campaign in which she excoriated Republican presiden-
tial candidate John McCain for his claim that the pay gap could
be narrowed if women would work harder and obtain more edu-
cation.58 According to focus groups, the Ledbetter advertisement
registered very well for Obama's targeting of working women in
the election. 59
With Obama's election on November 4, 2008 and larger ma-
jorities for Democrats in Congress, the Ledbetter Bill was on a
fast track to the President's desk. The enacted version of the Bill
differed very little from the first version. The Bill amends Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to adopt the "paycheck accrual
rule," any time the discriminatory paycheck can be rooted back
to a discriminatory pay practice. Each time a new paycheck is
57 See, for example, Carl Hulse, Republican Senators Block Pay Discrimination
Measure, NY Times A22 (Apr 24, 2008) (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch, "'he only ones who
will see increases in pay are some of the trial lawyers who bring cases.").
58 "Need Education" Advertisement, available at <http://www.youtube.comlwatch?v=
QxqjAejRF94> (last visited Mar 19, 2009) ("I worked at this plant for twenty years before
I learned the truth. I'd been paid forty percent less than men doing the same work. John
McCain opposed a law to give women equal pay for equal work. And he dismissed the
wage gap saying women just need education and training. I had the same skills as the
men at my plant. My family needed the money. On the economy, it's John McCain who
needs an education.").
59 Nina Totenberg, Fair Pay Law Strikes a Blow for Equal Pay, National Public Ra-
dio (Jan 29, 2009), available at <http://www.npr.org/templateststory/story.php?storyld=
99995431> (last visited Mar 19, 2009).
438 [2009:
TOWARD FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE
issued, a new 180 day period for these statutes under the
EEOC's jurisdiction is triggered during which a complainant
may properly challenge any discriminatory conduct that im-
pacted the paycheck's amount. A timely EEOC charge is a prere-
quisite to the plaintiff bringing suit. The plaintiff then can seek
to recover back pay for two years during which the discriminato-
ry practice occurred.
The Equal Pay Act is not enforced by the EEOC; it is subject
to the remedies of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.60 As
such, it does not require the filing of a charge as a prerequisite to
a lawsuit. Perhaps because of the existence of the Title VII claim
and perhaps because of the greater remedies available under
Title VII, Ledbetter did not pursue the Equal Pay Act claim. The
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Restoration Act was, on January 29,
2009, the first Bill signed by the new President.
As much a victory as the Ledbetter bill is for the renaissance
of congressional power over statutes interpreted by the courts,
some perspective is in order. The law applies only to statutes en-
forced by the EEOC. It does nothing to modify the Bennett
Amendment defenses that have served to defeat so many Equal
Pay Act cases in previous years. The Bennett Amendment pro-
vides that all defenses that apply to the Equal Pay Act also apply
to claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These
defenses include the broad catch all of any factor "other than
sex."61 Further, there is no discussion of comparable worth in any
proposed legislation.62
In addition, the Paycheck Fairness Act was introduced as a
companion to the Fair Pay Restoration Act that the President
signed. This Bill does deal directly with the Equal Pay Act, in-
cluding the beefing up of class actions, the limitation of employer
defenses based on prior lower pay received at another job or oth-
er market forces. The Paycheck Fairness Bill purports to make
Equal Pay Act litigation a greater threat to employers, which is
one of the reasons that former President Bush promised to veto it
if it made it to his desk. Although the Paycheck Fairness Bill
passed the House of Representatives twice, most recently in
January 2009 by a vote of 256 to 163, the prospects for the Bill in
58 29 USC § 201 et seq (2000 & Supp 2009).
61 29 USC § 206(d)(1).
62 See Carin Clauss, Comparable Worth-The Theory, Its Legal Foundation, and the
Feasibility of Implementation, 20 U Mich J L Ref 7, 17-83 (1986) (discussing the wage
gap associated with sex-segregated occupations).
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the Senate hinge upon whether sixty senators will vote to bring
the bill to a majority vote. This in turn depends on the final seat-
ing of all one-hundred Senators in the 111th Congress. Neverthe-
less, the Bill could flounder in the Senate without the momen-
tum that was gained by Ledbetter's identification with the Fair
Pay Restoration Act that reversed the result of her case.
The story of Lilly Ledbetter exemplifies a number of things
about the promise and limitations of legislation in the making of
social change. First, it is clear that Ledbetter fit into a political
moment and an opportunity to deal with, ironically, a "discrete
act" that was done to her by a majority of the Supreme Court.
Secondly, Ledbetter was a sympathetic figure not just because
her situation seemed familiar to many women, but because many
women and men could sympathize with how difficult it would
have been for Ledbetter to have obtained the data she needed to
file the EEOC charge in the first place. Finally, the legislation
was helped by the dovetailing presidential campaign and a larger
Democratic majority in Congress. Still, the Senate vote in favor
was sixty-one to thirty-six, and thus hardly overwhelming.
The fact that the Equal Pay Act amendments were put into
separate bills suggests that legislative analysis warned against
bringing the bills together because the two could not be sup-
ported as a package, even though there was an interrelationship
between the bills. Second, the statute of limitations aspect of the
case was sufficiently narrow to garner enough support, while the
broader goals of the Paycheck Fairness Act would have more dif-
ficulty commanding a majority. Finally, the Ledbetter Bill would
apply to a greater number of statutes enforced by the EEOC-
those dealing with age and disability-rather than a bill that
just deals with the Equal Pay Act, which is often seen as a prob-
lem for white women.
To be clear, Lilly Ledbetter's campaign created a rule that
will help women of all colors expose pay discrimination. But the
legislative campaign to do so resulted in a bifurcation of concerns
under one statute from the enhanced enforcement of another.
That this division is a natural result of legislation is understand-
able. But the overall goal of changing the attitudes toward un-
equal pay in the economy remains undone. Comparable worth is
certainly not anywhere on an agenda that focuses primarily on
the litigation process under protective labor law statutes. Future
plaintiffs may get in the courthouse door but still might not get
past the defenses of the Bennett Amendment. Thus, the Ledbet-
ter Act, while a procedural improvement, does not further the
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normative discourse about the problem of unequal pay in Ameri-
can society.
Michael McCann focused on the battle for equal pay as a
study of how social movements use litigation to mobilize. 63 Com-
parable worth is the idea that pay should be based on the value
to the institution of the jobs at issue; not necessarily whether
they require "equal skill, effort, and responsibility," in the words
of the Equal Pay Act.64 McCann showed how advocates tried to
use the existing statutory framework of equal pay to argue for
greater rights than the statute would seem to allow. 65 The Su-
preme Court's decision in Washington County v Gunther6 6 gave
hope to comparable worth advocates that the comparable worth
theory would work.67 Justice Brennan's opinion, while hailed as a
victory for comparable worth at the time, directly stated that the
Court was not deciding the issue of comparable worth. 68 Never-
theless, then-Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion went to
great pains to reject the idea that comparable worth claims were
actionable under the existing statutory framework. Rehnquist's
opinion has turned out to be the dominant view of the lower
courts, according to McCann: "It is now clear that the bulk of
subsequent decisions at all levels of the federal judiciary have
agreed more with the Rehnquist position and significantly closed
the doors of opportunity for comparable worth wage discrimina-
tion claims thought to be opened by Gunther."69
This end of the comparable worth campaign in the United
States did not stunt the growth of the theory in other countries.
In the 1992 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Com-
munity, Article 141 endorsed the concept of comparable worth.70
Also, the Canadian Human Rights Act makes comparable worth
a policy that all of the country's provinces should further.7 1 These
63 McCann, Rights at Work (cited in note 40).
64 29 USC § 206(2)(d)(1) (2000).
65 McCann, Rights at Work (cited in note 40).
66 452 US 161 (1981).
67 Id at 167-77 (holding that the Bennett Amendment explicitly incorporated only
limited defenses to unequal pay and did not otherwise bar suits based on a comparison of
payment for different jobs).
68 452 US 166.
69 McCann, Rights at Work at 37 (cited in note 40).
70 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb 7, 1992, OJ (C 224) 1 (1992) 1
CMLR 573 (1992), art 141 (as in effect in 1999), available at<http://eur-lex.europa.
eulen/treaties/datll1997E/htm11997E.html#0173010078> (last visited Mar 21, 2009).
See also Mark A. Rothstein and Lance Liebman, Employment Law 488 (Foundation 6th
ed 2007).
71 See Rothstein and Liebman, Employment Law (cited in note 70).
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examples show that in other countries, equal pay and compara-
ble worth are shown to be more of a priority than in the United
States. There now seems to be little interest or willingness to
debate the economic merits of comparable worth in the United
States as part of domestic legislation.
III. THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT: RESTORING THE RIGHTS
THAT WE ALREADY HAD
Now that Democrats control the White House and Congress,
labor leaders see their best chance in years to pass labor law
reform. Labor leaders are well aware, however, that bare majori-
ties are not sufficient without at least a filibuster-proof majority
in the Senate and a President who is willing to sign the legisla-
tion. This power gap was shown by the Employee Free Choice
Act ("EFCA"), which aimed to codify card check agreements, and
also increase penalties on employers. If enacted, the EFCA would
require the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") to certify a
union without directing an election if a majority of the bargain-
ing unit employees signed cards. In 2007, the Senate voted 51-48
to invoke cloture on the EFCA, nine votes short of the sixty
needed to end debate and vote on the Bill.72 Earlier in the year,
the House of Representatives passed the Bill by a vote of 241-
185, with President Bush promising to veto the Bill soon thereaf-
ter.73
One of the aims of the EFCA is to allow an arbitrator to de-
cide contract terms for parties who cannot agree on a contract
between the workers and the employer. This is intended to deal
with the reality that almost a third of elections conducted by the
NLRB resulted in no contract for the workers with the employer;
a testament to the weakness of the legal duty to bargain in good
faith.74 The Bill also would increase penalties for violations of
labor law, including treble damages and civil fines. 75 It would
72 Roll Call vote on the Motion to Invoke Cloture on the Motion to Proceed on HR 800,
110th Congress, at <http://www.senate.govllegislative[LIS/roll call-lists/roll-call-vote_
cfm.cfm?congress=110&session=l&vote=00227> (last visited Mar 21, 2009).
73 Roll Call on HR 800 in the 110th Congress, available at <http://clerk.house.
gov/evsI2007rollll8.xml> (last visited Mar 21, 2009).
74 Employee Free Choice Act Now, Myth vs. Reality: the Reality is the Employee Free
Choice Act Helps American Workers and their Families, available at <http:/www.
intellectualconservative.com/2009/01/15/critiquing-the-employee-free-choice-act/> (last
visited Mar 21, 2009). See also <http://www.employeefreechoiceactnow.orglindex.html>
(last visited Mar 21, 2009).
75 HR 1409, § 4(b) (cited in note 3).
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make injunctions to stop violations of the law mandatory, taking
away the discretion that the NLRB currently has to seek injunc-
tions for unfair labor practices, which it does currently only in
about 15 percent of cases.76
Although the EFCA has not passed Congress, its journey
from organized labor's legislative wish list to a serious possibility
in a mere four years showed the importance that organized labor
put on EFCA. By way of a contrasting example, the Family Med-
ical Leave Act was first introduced in 1984 and not passed until
1993. Nevertheless, one of the main features of the EFCA, the
card check provision, appears to be too controversial to be
enacted. This provision would require the employer to bargain
with the union on the presentation of cards authorizing the un-
ion to bargain on employees' behalf, rather than giving the em-
ployer the choice to demand a government conducted secret bal-
lot election.
The opponents of the EFCA focus on what they call the anti-
democratic aspects of the Bill. If signed into law, the Bill would
require employers to bargain with a union upon a showing that
more than 50 percent of its workers have authorized the union to
bargain on their behalf. This could be accomplished by a showing
of signed authorization cards presented by the union; thus em-
ployers dubbed the EFCA, "the card check bill."
Despite the significant victory that the passage of the EFCA
would represent in the new Democratic-controlled Congress, its
significance also can be overstated. Current law already allows
an employer to recognize and bargain with a union on the basis
of authorization cards alone.77 Further, students of labor law his-
tory know that the employer's ability to demand a secret ballot
election upon a showing of cards is nowhere in the text of the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 ("NLRA"). 78
In fact, the NLRA says nothing about how bargaining repre-
sentatives are to be chosen, requiring only that the employer
bargain in good faith with "representatives designated or se-
lected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of
the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes."79 The
76 HR 1409, § 4(a), amending National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 USC
§ 160(1) (2000). William B. Gould, IV, The Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law
Reform, and What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-Management Relations
Law in the United States, 43 USF L Rev 291 (2008).
77 29 USC § 159 (2000).
78 29 USC § 151 et seq (2000).
79 29 USC § 159(a) (2000).
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National Labor Relations Board's function, as described later in
the statute, is to confirm that the bargaining unit is "appropri-
ate" and to determine "question[s] of representation."80
In 1969, the Supreme Court determined that the employer
has the absolute right to demand a secret ballot election in
NLRB v Gissel Packing,81 a case that upheld the legitimacy of
authorization cards to show majority support after an employer's
egregious unfair labor practices.8 2 George Will, among others
editorializing against the EFCA, quoted from Gissel on the op-ed
page of the Washington Post, arguing that "the Supreme Court
has said that the card-check system is 'admittedly inferior to the
election process."'8 3 What Will and other labor opponents do not
mention is that this quote comes from Gissel, the case described
above which held that, indeed, bargaining representatives can be
chosen with authorization cards, even if the union loses a subse-
quent secret ballot election, if the employer has committed egre-
gious unfair labor practices.8 4
This brings us back to the very reason that the EFCA is
needed-because of egregious and rampant unfair labor practices
by employers during election campaigns.8 5 But it also brings us
back to the importance of who occupies the White House, the
same person who picks the Justices on the United States Su-
preme Court and the members of the NLRB. A new Supreme
Court line up may look at the plain language of the NLRA and
determine that the statute already requires the employer to rec-
ognize and bargain with a union upon any showing of majority
support.
Indeed, this was the view of the NLRB and the Court until
the oral argument in Gissel. In that case, counsel for the NLRB
argued to the Supreme Court that an employer could refuse to
bargain with a union that presented a facially accurate card ma-
jority even in the absence of a good faith doubt as to the validity
80 29 USC § 159(c)(1)(B) (2000).
81 395 US 575 (1969).
82 Id at 597-99.
83 George F. Will, Dues and Don'ts: For Unions, Coercion Over Persuasion, Wash Post
A19 (June 20, 2007) (quoting Gissel, 395 US at 603).
84 395 US at 597-99. See also Laura J. Cooper and Dennis R. Nolan, The Story of the
NLRB v. Gissel Packing: The Practical Limits of Paternalism, in Laura J. Cooper and
Catherine L. Fisk, eds, Labor Law Stories Ch 5 (Foundation 2005).
85 Kate Bronfenbrenner and Tom Juravich, It Takes More than House Calls: Organiz-
ing to Win with a Comprehensive Union Strategy, in Richard W. Hurd and Rudolph A.
Oswald, eds, Organizing to Win: New Research on Union Strategies 41 (Cornell 1998).
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of the authorization cards.8 6 For forty years since the NLRB
stated in the Gissel case that an employer could insist on an elec-
tion in all cases, except those where the employer has committed
serious unfair labor practices, employers have held on to the
right. Thus, the EFCA simply restates the law that seems to ex-
ist already within the text of the statute. It of course would be a
powerful symbol to clarify the intent of the law with the EFCA,
but other incentives for employer misconduct will exist.
But the EFCA as currently drafted does not address suffi-
ciently the problems of one of the largest sectors who would like
to be organized, immigrant workers. Certainly, a duty to bargain
on the basis of cards alone would be an improvement over long
election campaign battles in which immigrant workers are
threatened with deportation. The facts of Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds, Inc v NLRB 7 are illustrative of how even in the absence
of an election, immigrant workers are caught between the mar-
gins of different bodies of law, such that reforming just one of
them will not be enough.88
In Hoffman, the employer ran a plastics business in South
Central Los Angeles.8 9 In December 1988, a local of the Steel-
workers began an organizing drive among Hoffman's employees.
A union organizer visited the plant frequently and distributed
authorization cards to the employees, including the employee at
the center of the Supreme Court decision, Jose Castro.90 In Jan-
uary 1989, the employer interrogated employees about their un-
ion activity and then laid nine employees off, including Castro.
The union did file an election petition, but withdrew it a few days
before the election. 9'
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the
employer because of the layoffs.9 2 An Administrative Law Judge
("ALJ") found that several employees had been fired in violation
of the NLRA. At a hearing to determine the standard remedies
such as back pay and reinstatement for the employees, Castro
86 Gissel, 395 US at 609.
87 535 US 137 (2002).
88 Id at 146-52 (holding that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
("IRCA") prohibited the NLRB from awarding backpay to undocumented aliens).
89 Id at 140. See also Catherine L. Fisk and Michael J. Wishnie, The Story of Hoff-
man Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights without Remedies for Undocu-
mented Immigrants, in Laura J. Cooper and Catherine L. Fisk, eds, Labor Law Stories Ch
5 (Foundation 2005).
90 Id.
91 535 US at 140.
92 Id at 140-41.
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admitted that he was not authorized to work in the United
States and was actually born in Mexico. 93 The ALJ decided, con-
sistent with NLRB practice, that reinstatement would not be
available because of immigration law, but that back pay was not
foreclosed because it is a remedy authorized by the statute and is
a deterrent to future unfair labor practices. 94 The NLRB and the
D.C. Circuit affirmed this ruling.95
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit. 96 Writing for
the five member majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist ruled
that granting back pay-pay that would have been earned but
for the unlawful discrimination-to a worker who was not autho-
rized to work in the United States would "trench upon" the im-
portant federal policies that are served by the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"). 97 Thus, the NLRB's
remedy was beyond the NLRB's competence to award and was
struck down. Hoffman has become a symbol of much of what is
wrong with labor law, such as inadequate remedies, long delays,
and a willingness by employers to retaliate against workers who
are vulnerable because of their immigration status.
The EFCA does little to change the dynamics of immigrant
worker organizing. As I have argued in other work, without
changes in immigration law, the purposes of protecting immi-
grant workers under the NLRA, such as avoiding unfair competi-
tion and exploitation and deterring unfair labor practices, will
not be effectuated. 98 Even without wholesale immigration reform,
a mere change in the law restoring the NLRB's practice of grant-
ing back pay to workers regardless of immigration status is not
politically saleable because of prevalent attitudes against undo-
cumented immigrants in our society. In the end, immigrant
workers regardless of status are a "discrete and insular minority"
which cannot be fully protected through statutes.99 As I will dis-
cuss below, one of the ways to accomplish this is to encourage
judges to adopt universal norms of worker protection, not just as
93 Id at 141.
94 Id at 141-42.
95 535 US at 142.
96 Id at 142, 152.
97 Id at 137, 138, 144, 151.
98 Garcia, 8 U Pa J Labor and Emp| L at 285-86 (cited in note 36); Garcia, 55 Fla L
Rev at 519 (cited in note 36); Garcia, 36 U Mich J L Reform at 765 (cited in note 36).
99 United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938) (using the
phrase "discrete and insular minorities" to describe those groups of persons that require
judicial protection in order to access their constitutional rights).
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rights in themselves, but also as guidance for the decision of dif-
ficult domestic law cases.
Finally, the passage of the EFCA has been cast by its oppo-
nents as a threat to democracy and even the First Amendment,
in "taking away the secret ballot in union elections." 100 This is
another example in which the Constitution has been used to ar-
gue against worker protective norms. The merits of the claim
seem dubious, since card check is a process of affirmatively sup-
porting a union that is voluntary for the worker and is not being
required by the government as where affiliation with organiza-
tions was requested by subpoena.'10 Nevertheless, the opponents
of EFCA have consistently framed the debate in terms of demo-
cratic values. At the same time, the supporters of EFCA have not
effectively made the claim that the low unionization rate reflects
a deeper crisis of democracy. Advocates for the EFCA and for
greater freedom of association in the work place must make the
claim on those terms to better its chances for passage.
IV. THE NEED FOR A "WORKERS' RIGHTS ARE HUMAN
RIGHTS" APPROACH
What is needed, then, besides further legislative correction?
Certainly, there will be a need for improvements in statutory
protection. As discussed above, however, statutory change is ne-
cessary but not sufficient to fully protect vulnerable and low-
wage workers. For low-wage workers, legislative change can
have palliative impact, but long-lasting change will come
through normative innovations under constitutional and interna-
tional law. In the case of gender relations, the command of equal
protection under the law will apply only to public employment,
but as in the case of other constitutional gender cases, stereo-
types and norms about equal pay can be destabilized through
litigation in the public sector.
Even rarer is any discussion of the international norms on
equal pay that can be brought to bear on the United States' en-
forcement of the Equal Pay Act and other civil rights statutes.
The Equal Remuneration Convention, Number 100, of the Inter-
national Labor Organization ("ILO") requires governments to
take necessary steps to ensure that men and women receive
100 See David Rivkin and Lee Casey, Why Card Check is Unconstitutional, Wall St J
A23 (Mar 30, 2009).
101 NAACP v Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 US 449 (1958).
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equal pay.10 2 The North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") also contains the equal pay principle as one of those
which its member countries such as Canada, Mexico and the
United States must "strive to improve." 10 3 The North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("NAALC"), a side agreement
to NAFTA, allows citizens in its member countries to bring com-
plaints to dispute resolution bodies in each country that one of
the three countries is failing to enforce its own labor laws. 10 4 This
has led to a number of complaints brought by unions and advoca-
cy groups for violations of employment discrimination and free-
dom of association principles, among others.
Not surprisingly, advocates bypassed international forums
to address the Ledbetter decision, in light of the relatively friend-
ly Congress and the pending presidential election. But doing so
accepted the correctness of the decision under the current statu-
tory regime. An ILO complaint at least would test whether the
Supreme Court's decision effectively wrote the right of equal pay
out of the law through procedural means. This is what happened
in the case of Hoffman, where the Supreme Court held that un-
documented workers were not entitled to back pay for violations
of the NLRA. 105 The American Federation of Labor and the Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO") made a complaint
to the ILO after the decision, and it led to a finding that the
United States should change its law to effectuate the principles
of freedom of association that the United States should obey by
virtue of its membership in the ILO.106 This is one example of
how labor rights can be seen as human rights.
102 Equal Remuneration Convention (No 100) (164 ratifications), Concerning Equal
Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, 165 UNTS 303
(June 29, 1951), available at <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?ClO0> (last vi-
sited Mar 21, 2009). See also Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conven-
tions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 Am J Intl L 341, 342 (1995) ("[Aldherence to a
convention will not change, or require change, in U.S. laws, policies or practices, even
where they fall below international standards."); Louis Michael Seidman, Our Unsettled
Constitution: A New Defense of Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 113 (Yale 2001).
103 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("NAALC"), 32 ILM 1499, 1503
(Sept 14, 1993). See also North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") Between the
Government of Canada, the Government of United Mexican States and the Government
of the United States of America, 32 ILM 605 (1993).
104 NAALC at 1503 (cited in note 103).
105 Hoffman, 535 US at 140.
106 ILO Governing Body Establishes Commission of Inquiry to Examine Violations of
Trade Union Rights in Belarus Latest Report of ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
Cites Belarus, Cuba, Zimbabwe, Others, ILO/03/48 (ILO Nov 20, 2009), available at
<http://www.ilo.orgglobal/About theILO/Mediaand-public-informationfPress-releases/
lang--enIWCMS_005299/index.htm> (last visited Mar 21, 2009).
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But it will not be easy to incorporate international norms in-
to the discourse on the protection of workers' rights. First, there
are structural obstacles to the incorporation of international law
in federal law, as the United States has not signed on to all in-
ternational instruments concerning worker rights. As a member
of the ILO, the United States is deemed by the ILO to have ac-
cepted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work and Annex, which holds freedom of association; collective
bargaining and freedom from involuntary servitude, child labor
and unlawful discrimination as fundamental to all member
states regardless of whether they have adopted the conventions
corresponding to the Fundamental Declaration.10 7 Nevertheless,
the United States has not adopted all of the individual conven-
tions underlying the Declaration, such as Conventions 87 and 98
regarding freedom of association and collective bargaining.
Whether the ILO's conception of membership is enough to place
constraints on the United States to comport with international
law is an argument that advocates must continue to make, in the
face of some resistance from the United States. Simultaneously,
however, the United States often responds that it need not adopt
international conventions because domestic law already com-
ports with international law. As described above, however, many
workers fall through the gaps between domestic realities and
international ideals.
Second, and a more vexing problem, is the inability to en-
force many international and constitutional law principles. We
first must confront the inability to enforce treaties that are not
self-executing, which prevents residents of the United States
from suing in federal courts to enforce them. Many of these trea-
ties only impose obligations on governments to comply with in-
ternational standards but do not give litigants the ability to chal-
lenge the government's failure to do so in court. For noncitizens,
however, there is the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, which allows
aliens to sue in federal court "for a tort only, committed in viola-
tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. '0 8
This statute has been used to challenge jus cogens offenses such
as torture and forced labor committed with the help of private
companies, but the courts have been less likely to hold many la-
107 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Annex, 37
ILM 1233, 1233-34 (1998) ('The Declaration adopted by the Conference proclaims that all
member States of the ILO have a legal obligation arising from their membership in the
ILO to apply certain basic principles of fundamental human rights.").
108 28 USC § 1350 (2000).
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bor rights violations as actionable against private companies.
Nevertheless, there have been inroads in some district court de-
cisions to hold companies liable for violations of freedom of asso-
ciation rights, but generally only in connection with acts of mur-
der or other violence.
Finally, the act of citing international law has been criticized
by elected officials and some judges. Judge Richard Posner, an
influential judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, has
been skeptical of the use of international law in federal courts. 109
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has decried the use of in-
ternational law as guidance to the Court in cases involving sod-
omy, affirmative action, and the juvenile death penalty. 110 Inter-
national law has been called undemocratic and more protective
of workers than the United States law has traditionally been."'
During the hearings on the nomination of Judge Sonia Soto-
mayor to the Supreme Court, many of the senators were critical
of the use of international law in judicial opinions.
All of these challenges to incorporating international law
norms into law are daunting. The benefits of doing so, however,
are not to bring international law in for its own sake, or because
it might be more protective of the worker. Indeed, in some in-
stances it is far from clear that workers would be better off under
the vague outlines of international or constitutional principles
than the specific, technical protections of statutes. The reason for
doing so is the same for attempting to bring constitutional norms
to bear where possible. It is to show that Work Law rights are
fundamental and intrinsic for inhabitants of all nations to (1)
recognize their full potential in a democracy, (2) show the com-
mon bonds between all workers regardless of status, and (3)
show that workers' rights should not be as subject to the shifting
winds of politics as they have been; rather, certain fundamental
principles should be agreed upon. I will address each of these in
turn.
First, it is clear that labor rights are needed to effectuate
many other rights in our society that are considered fundamen-
tal, even when only asserted against the government. The First
109 Richard A. Posner, 56 U Chi L Rev at 1334 (cited in note 7).
110 See Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitu-
tional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer,
3 Intl J Const L 519, 529-30 (2005).
111 Donald Dowling, Jr., The Practice of International Labor and Employment Law:




Amendment to the Constitution, for example, only protects citi-
zens against government abridgement of rights to speak, asso-
ciate, and assemble. Nevertheless, if the freedom to associate in
unions is squelched by employers to the point where workers are
afraid to assemble under the threat of losing their jobs, they will
be less likely to join together for political or other civic purposes.
Sociologist Robert Putnam has identified a tendency in modern
society for "bowling alone," that is, not participating in civic
groups. 112 But, regardless of whether this is a cause or effect of
the decline of unionization over the last fifty years, there is little
doubt that a lack of organizations at work, where most people
spend the majority of their time, does not add to civic ferment.
Further, constitutional rights for public employees, who can
bring cases under the First Amendment, have been cut back by
recent Supreme Court and legislative decisions. 113 This requires
a renewed attention to the Constitution as a source of rights, but
also perhaps to other sources of rights, which the United States
labor movement has been utilizing recently.
Second, statutes by their nature divide workers into differ-
ent categories. Rights under the NLRA, for example, do not apply
to supervisors. And yet the NLRA in its first ten years of exis-
tence allowed supervisors to form unions. It was not until the
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which cut back the right to organize in
a number of ways that supervisors were excluded from the pro-
tection of the law. 114 Moreover, the Supreme Court has gradually
made it more likely that people would be considered supervisors
rather than employees, thus removing workers from the protec-
tion of the Act.115 This is another example of how protective labor
legislation just as easily can be regressive in its coverage and
scope as it can be improved through progressive political gains.
International law, while not silent on the question of super-
visors, is much more universal in its coverage of workers. There
is no definition of "employee" in the ILO conventions. Rights are
held to apply to "workers," as ILO Convention 87 says, "without
112 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Commu-
nity 1-24 (Simon & Schuster 2000) (discussing the disintegration of social capital and its
effect on the decline in social networks, civic engagement and community organizations).
113 Garcetti v Ceballos, 547 US 210 (2006) (holding that a public employee could not
state a constitutional claim for retaliation based on statements that were part of the part
of the plaintiffs' job duties).
114 29 USC § 185 (2000).
115 See, for example, NLRB v Kentucky River Community Care, Inc, 532 US 706, 711-
12 (2001) (holding that employers have the burden of proving their employees' supervi-
sory status in an unfair labor practice hearing).
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any distinction whatsoever."'1 16 When the Supreme Court recent-
ly retracted the coverage of the NLRA from a group of charge
nurses in Kentucky River Community Care v NLRB,117 the AFL-
CIO took a complaint to the ILO.118 This is another example of
how international norms might be used to further the discussion
about the restrictive nature of the law, even though there does
not seem to be much will to change the result in Kentucky River
legislatively.
Finally, we should ask what would elevate workers' rights
norms to a place where they are not merely a political football.
This is not to suggest that there never will be some disagree-
ment, often in good faith, about the intent of the statute. Indeed,
some of the beauty of our system is that politics allows different
and new conceptions of labor and employment law with each new
administration. Whatever the benefits for deliberative democracy
of these pendulum swings, however, they do not lead to better
protection for workers. As I have pointed out above, even under
recent Democratic administrations, pro-worker labor law reform
was often stifled and incomplete. For example, in its first sixteen
years of existence, the Family and Medical Leave Act has pro-
vided rights to many workers, but for a large group of the popu-
lation, it is still unusable because it provides only an entitlement
to twelve weeks of unpaid leave." 9
This strategy might be criticized for not providing enough
support for workers in desperate need of relief under statutory
schemes that need enforcement. My goal is not to diminish the
needs for statutory protections. Instead, this Article is about the
way that public international and constitutional norms can be
brought to bear to enhance the enforcement of existing statutes
and encourage the creation of new ones. In the end, how we see
workers' rights is influenced by our position on a number of dif-
ferent issues. International and constitutional workers' rights
principles at least stand apart from the political processes that
have led to their existence and, ultimately, their deterioration.
116 ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, United States (Case No 2227), Report
No. 332, 1 559, 610 (2003), available at <http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards
normeslibsyndindex.cfm? Lang =EN&hdroff zl> (last visited Mar 21, 2009).
117 NLRB v Kentucky River Community Care, Inc, 532 US 706 (2001).
118 Complaint Against the Government of the United States Presented by the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) Report No
349, Case No 2524, available at <http://www.ilo.orglilolexIcgi-lex/pdconv.pl?host=status
01&textbase-iloeng&document=4787&chapter=3&query(United+States)%40ref&highlig
ht=&querytype=bool&context=O> (last visited Mar 21, 2009).
119 29 USC §§ 2601-54 (2000 & Supp 2008).
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I do not suggest that in all cases statutory change cannot
transmit norms. Rebecca Zietlow has made a powerful argument
in her book to that effect.' 20 There is an interesting counterfac-
tual case to be made: What if Brown v Board of Education'2' had
not been decided? 122 Would the United States have made the
progress in civil rights that it has with statutes alone? Perhaps
in the area of civil rights, permanent norms against discrimina-
tion could have been achieved through statutory change alone.
The backlash against the Court's Brown decision shows that con-
stitutional norms did not take hold immediately. And yet, the
Court's place as an institution purportedly above politics may
have led to greater legitimacy of its nondiscrimination principle
under the Constitution. Again, despite the studies conducted by
Gerald Rosenberg for his book The Hollow Hope: Can The Courts
Bring About Social Change?, it is hard to know with certainty
whether change would have occurred without Brown.123
Whether Brown was necessary for a change in attitudes
about race and civil rights, the field of Work Law is constructed
as a contest between warring factions and as zero sum games.
The statutory and regulatory competition that takes place be-
tween labor and capital misses the mark in terms of a minimum
floor of fundamental rights that should be agreed upon. As a re-
sult, employer resistance to unions is up, and minimum wage
requirements are flouted.
Some argue that when dollars and cents are involved volun-
tary compliance with fundamental workers' rights cannot be ex-
pected. As a result, many feel that workers' rights are simply a
matter of political struggle. Instead, what is needed is a concep-
tion of workers' rights that transcends politics. Despite the poli-
tics inherent in constitutional lawmaking, from Supreme Court
appointments to coalition building on the Court, constitutional
120 Rebecca Zietlow, Enforcing Equality: Congress, the Constitution and the Protection
of Individual Rights 118 (NYU 2006) (discussing specifically how Congress has acted as
an important protector of rights as the Supreme Court has, using Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as an example).
121 394 US 294 (1955).
122 Id at 298-99 (holding that any local law allowing racial discrimination in public
education is unconstitutional).
123 Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can The Courts Bring About Social
Change? 338 (Chicago 1st ed 1991) ("U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers
of significant social reform."). But see, for example, Michael Paris and Kevin McMahon,
The Politics of Rights Revisited: Rosenberg, McCann and the New Institutionalism, in
David Schultz, ed, Leveraging the Law: Using the Courts to Achieve Social Change 63
(Peter Lang 1998).
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norms have inherently more staying power than statutes simply
because it is harder to amend the Constitution.
One legitimately can ask whether it makes sense to argue
for the labor movement to return to constitutional norms as a
primary source of protection. Indeed, a main impetus for the
NLRA was to avoid the courts and constitutional litigation. Pro-
gressive attempts to pass labor legislation in the early twentieth
century were thwarted by substantive due process decisions such
as Lochner v New York. 124 The courts were inhospitable to labor
organizing and frequently enjoined peaceful labor disputes. 125
And yet, it was labor organizing in the early twentieth century
that fortified the First Amendment as a robust protection against
government interference with expressive activity. More recently,
that ground has been ceded to a resurgence of the rights of pri-
vate property holders to resist labor activity, as well as the com-
mandeering of First Amendment principles by employers to res-
ist unionization.
There are certainly dangers in over reliance on constitution-
al rights. By their nature, constitutional rights are generally li-
mited to government action, except in the case of the Thirteenth
Amendment, which applies both to public and private action.
Nevertheless, even as to public employees, the labor movement
has retreated from constitutionally-protected freedom of associa-
tion after some notable setbacks. In the end, the constitutional
protection for the "right to assemble" should apply to all types of
associations, even those for economic purposes, but the courts
have limited the right to "expressive associations," which itself
has had pernicious effects on state protections against discrimi-
nation. A broader vision of freedom of association is found in in-
ternational protections, and can be used to inform statutory
questions when the issue returns to the Supreme Court.
Despite different forms of advocacy, protective labor statutes
will continue to be necessary. But they must be drafted, con-
strued, and enforced in keeping with fundamental principles em-
bodied in the Constitution and international law. These prin-
ciples include deference to freedom of association, and construing
existing statutes in favor of worker protection, as the Court
might have done in Ledbetter and Hoffman Plastic Compounds.
124 198 US 45, 53 (1905) (holding that the "right to free contract" was implicit in the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
125 See, for example, Vegelahn v Guntner, 44 NE 1077, 1077-78 (1896) (holding that
the coercion by union interfered with the right of an employer to hire whom it pleases,
and the right of workers to enter into employment).
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The constitutional dialogue can begin with the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude, but it need
not end there. The First Amendment protects the freedom to as-
sociate from government interference. The explicit reference to
the right to assemble in the Constitution shows the importance
that the Framers placed on associations as an important part of
democratic values. As discussed above, it has been part of the
ILO's mission since the founding of that organization in 1919.
These principles can form the backbone of a canon of con-
struction that courts can use to be more protective of worker
rights-the Charming Betsy 126 analysis. In the 1804 Charming
Betsy decision, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: "[a]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed in violation of the law of
nations, if any other possible construction remains."127 This in-
terpretive rule is used by courts to construe statutes in a way
that does not conflict with treaties ratified by the United States.
This has been commonly used in international law and could be
used in a number of contexts to reach a result that is more pro-
tective of workers' rights than recent court cases have been.
Charles Morris, in his book The Blue Eagle at Work, has also
used Charming Betsy to buttress his arguments that the NLRA,
as written, requires an employer to bargain directly with a group
of employees even if they do not speak for all of the employees at
a workplace. 128 Thus, international law principles can and should
inform statutory interpretation, as long as statutes continue to
be the dominant form of lawmaking to protect low-wage workers.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A NEW LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS ABOUT
WORKERS' RIGHTS
The transmission of norms about the law is the subject of the
work of many scholars. Much of the groundwork of this field was
laid by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. He posited that law
has discursive and symbolic power. 129 Other scholars have taken
an empirical look at the law's transmission of norms.130 Legal
126 6 US (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
127 Id at 118.
128 Charles J. Morris, The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the
Workplace (Cornell 2004).
129 Pierre Bourdieu and Richard Terdiman, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of
the Juridical Field, 38 Hastings L J 805, 838 (1987) ('Law is the quintessential form of
the symbolic power of naming that creates the things named."); Pierre Bourdieu and John
B. Thompson, Language and Symbolic Power (Harvard 1991).
130 See, for example, Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law:
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consciousness scholars attempt to determine the theoretical and
empirical ways that the law mattered to individuals. 131
A different consciousness about labor rights can be transmit-
ted in a number of ways, whether through court decisions, legis-
lation, or even statements by the President of the United States.
This may not affect the attitudes of all people, but it may have an
effect on courts' willingness to enforce statutes in a way that is
consistent with the worker friendly principles of international
law.
The point of this Article has been to apply some of the les-
sons of the discursive effect of law to the field of Work Law. One
of the ways in which the law has failed low-wage workers has
been in employer resistance to following the law protecting labor
organizing. For a variety of reasons, there is a moral as well as
legal valence to discriminating against people on the basis of
their race and sex. Violating the law of union organizing, wage
and hour laws and immigration enforcement has less of an im-
pact because the law is seen as part of a political and economic
struggle for resources and power. In some sense, Work Law is
essentially contested and will always in some way be a struggle
for resources and power. There is a need to change the terms of
the way workers' rights are debated. The way to do this, I think,
is through a human rights discourse. In the end, even if the law
is not completely effective in resolving social problems, it may
provide important normative lessons that will encourage com-
pliance. This Article has tried to determine the best way to trans-
late laws into norms that encourage compliance. In the area of
Work Law, statutes have not been completely translated into
norms. Instead, the political see-saw vacillates between protec-
tion and retrenchment of workers' rights.
A human rights frame is not a cure-all for the needs of low-
wage, vulnerable workers. The constitutional welfare rights
movement and "the end of welfare" show that constitutional
rights are not necessarily going to translate into an ethic of care
about the poor. 13 2 Nevertheless, the language of rights has a
Stories from Everyday Life 34-39, 224-30 (Chicago 1998) (discussing the ways in which
Americans' lives are affected by the way they think about and use the law).
131 Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L & Socy Rev 869, 879-87 (1988) (discuss-
ing various normative orders).
132 Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 1960-
1973 (Yale 1991); Austin Sarat and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds, The World's Cause Lawyers
Make: Structure and Agency in Legal Practice at 58-59 (Stanford 2005). On the ethic of




powerful sway on individuals, and indeed is the language that is
used to argue against worker protections in the name of "freedom
of contract." What must occur is the re-conceptualization of
worker rights that governments, courts and private parties see
as fundamental-including the right to associate and bargain
collectively, and be free from discrimination.
In the context of the welfare rights movement, Elizabeth
Wickenden said in 1969: "I think you have to face up to the fact
that you cannot eat welfare rights, you cannot clothe your child-
ren in rights, and you do not really take your place in society by
having a remedy for injustice under the law."'133 These words
could be equally true for low-wage workers' rights as for the
rights of low-wage workers. Despite this realization, however,
workers' rights will continue to be a part of the legal landscape.
How these rights are viewed is part of the problem for low-wage
workers. Without some minimum floor of rights, low-wage work-
ers will continue to lose ground in wages, benefits and legal pro-
tection. As I have argued, these rights are best grounded in the
fundamental norms of free labor-the right to freedom of associ-
ation and the right to be free from discrimination.
133 Davis, Brutal Need at 119 (cited in note 132) (quoting Wickenden).
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